current study, which draws on speakers from both dialects. St'át'imcets is highly endangered, with fewer than 100 first language speakers remaining.
The data in this paper are drawn both from textual materials and from primary fieldwork. We have used a variety of elicitation techniques in our fieldwork, including judgments about the felicity and/or truth of utterances in particular discourse contexts, as well as translations either from English to St'át'imcets, or vice-versa. See Matthewson (2004) for further discussion of the methodology employed here.
2.
The St'át'imcets marker ka-…-a
We begin this section by briefly describing some relevant morphosyntactic properties of ka-…-a, before turning to its interpretation.
The morphosyntax of ka-…-a
The discontinuous morpheme ka-…-a is referred to as 'resultative' in van Eijk (1997) and as 'out of control' in Demirdache (1997) and Davis and Demirdache (2000) . We gloss it here as 'circumstantial' in anticipation of our own circumstantial modal analysis. Both parts of ka-…-a are probably historically related to second-position enclitics, ka-to the irrealis enclitic =ka, and -a to the 'reinforcing' or 'existential' enclitic =a. 2 However, in the contemporary language, ka-…-a clearly constitutes a distinct morpheme, as can easily be shown by the fact that, unlike second position clitics, it remains fixed to the main predicate in clauses containing pre-predicative auxiliaries. This is shown in (1) for ka-versus =ka and in (2) for -a versus =a: in each case, the enclitic appears after the auxiliary huz'/cuz' 'going to', while both elements of ka-…-a remain affixed to the main predicate nas 'go '. 3 (1) huz'=lhkan=ká=hem'=t'u7 ka-nás-a 4 going.to=1SG.SUBJ=IRR=ANTI=ADD CIRC-go-CIRC 'I think I'll be able to go.'
(2) ti=húz'=a ka-nás-a Demirdache (1997) for previous discussion. 5 These are listed in (3). We use the term 'interpretation' here in order to avoid the presumption that ka-…-a is ambiguous between different readings; in fact, one of the main claims of this paper is that these different interpretations can be captured by a unified analysis that posits no lexical ambiguity for ka-…-a.
(3)
Interpretations of ka-…-a: a. ability b.
manage-to c. accidentally d. suddenly e.
non-controllable
In this sub-section we will illustrate each of these five interpretations, and in the next sub-section we will show that the five interpretations are reducible to two. In section 3, we will show that the two interpretations of St'át'imcets ka-…-a correspond to existential and universal circumstantial modal uses, respectively.
The ability interpretation
The ability interpretation is illustrated in (4-5); it covers typical ability attributions, which in English use can or be able to.
(4) a. cúy'=lhkacw=ha ka-cwák-a lh=ma7g'úlm'ecw=as going.to=1SG.SUBJ=YNQ
CIRC-wake-CIRC COMP=daybreak=3CONJ
'Are you going to be able to wake up at dawn?' (Davis 2006) ' We can't get the firewood to burn.'
Example (5) shows ka-…-a affixed to the same root, but with three different argument/event structures. In (5a), it attaches to the bare (unaccusative) root gwel 'get burned' (an achievement); in (5b) it attaches to the active intransitive gwel-cál 'do burning' (an activity); and in (7c) it adds to the causative transitive gwel-s 'burn something' (an accomplishment).
The manage-to interpretation
The manage-to interpretation is illustrated in (6).
(6) a.
ka-gwél-s=kan-a CIRC-burn-CAUS=1SG.SUBJ-CIRC
'I managed to get it lit.' ( van Eijk 1997:51) b. ka-cwák-s=kan-a na=wá7 xúq'wleqs n-snúk'wa7 CIRC-wake-CAUS=1SG.SUBJ-CIRC DET=IMPF snore 1SG.POSS-friend 'I managed to wake up my snoring friend.' (Davis 2006) c. ka-t'ál-a=ha ta=káoh-sw=a l=ta=kwézkwzem=a s7aolt CIRC-stop-CIRC=YNQ DET=car-2SG.POSS=EXIS on=DET=smooth=EXIS ice 'Did your car manage to stop on the slippery ice?' (Literally: 'Was your car stoppable on the slippery ice?') (Davis 2006) d. qwenúxw=kan inátcwas, t'u7 ka-tsunam'-cal=lhkán-a=t'u7 sick=1SG.SUBJ yesterday but
CIRC-teach-ACT=1SG.SUBJ-CIRC=ADD
'I was sick yesterday, but I still managed to teach.' (Davis 2006) 
The accidentally interpretation
The examples in (7) illustrate the accidentally reading. The English translations do not always contain the word 'accidentally' (see for example (7e)), but the meaning is that the action was not on purpose.
(7) a.
ka-gwél-s=kan-a ta=ngúy'tten=a

CIRC-burn-CAUS=1SG.SUBJ-CIRC DET=bed=EXIS
'I accidentally set my bed on fire.' (Davis 2006) 
CIRC-break-CAUS-3ERG-CIRC DET=window=EXIS DET=boy=EXIS
'The boy broke the window accidentally.' (Davis 2006) e. ka-nk'méq'w=lhkan-a aylh l=ti=n-gwáts'-cal-ten=a CIRC-immerse=1SG.SUBJ-CIRC then in=DET=LOC-irrigate-ACT-thing=EXIS 'I fell into the ditch.' (Matthewson 2005:158) 
The suddenly interpretation
The suddenly reading is shown in (8). 
The raspberries got squished and the pot got dented.' (Matthewson 2005:73) Predicates with an external argument, including those with a natural force or other inanimate entity as subject, fail to yield a non-controllable interpretation with ka-…-a. Instead, these predicates get only ability and/ or accidental interpretations. With inanimate subjects, such interpretations are incongruous, as shown in the (a) examples in (10) and (11) below, since inanimate entities cannot generally be ascribed abilities or perform accidental actions. When asked to provide transitive sentences with inanimate subjects and non-controllable meanings, speakers volunteer plain causatives without ka-…-a, as shown in (10b-11b).
(10) a. # ka-tayt-s-tumulh-ás-a ta=wá7 q'wel sts'úqwaz' CIRC-hungry-CAUS-1PL.OBJ-3ERG-CIRC DET=IMPF cooked fish # 'The cooked fish managed to/accidentally made us hungry.' b.
tayt-s-túmulh-as ta=wá7 q'wel sts'úqwaz' hungry-CAUS-1PL.OBJ-3ERG DET=IMPF cooked fish 'The cooked fish made us hungry.' (11) a. # wá7=k'a láti7 stám'=as ku=ka-qwenuxw-s-tumc-ás-a IMPF=EPIS there what=3CONJ DET=CIRC-sick-CAUS-1SG.OBJ-3ERG-CIRC # 'There must have been something that managed to make/accidentally made me ill there.'
b. wá7=k'a láti7 stám'=as ku=qwenúxw-s-tumc-as IMPF=EPIS there what=3CONJ DET=sick-CAUS-1SG.OBJ-3ERG 'There must have been something that made me ill there.'
We discuss this restriction further in Section 4.
Some predicates with a non-controllable interpretation show free variation between the ka-…-a version and a bare root intransitive (12a-b), or between the ka-…-a version and a form containing the inchoative infix -7-(13a-b) or C 2 ('out of control') reduplication (14a-b). In these cases, there is no detectable difference in meaning between the two forms. In fact, some non-controllable predicates denoting changes of state have been lexicalized so that they only occur with ka-…-a, as shown in (15) , while still others have been lexicalized so that they fail to occur with ka-...-a altogether, as shown in (16) . (15) We will argue below that the variation associated with the non-controllable interpretation of ka-…-a comes about because of the very close relationship between universal circumstantial interpretations of eventive predicates and plain event descriptions; in fact, in many cases, there are no detectable truth-conditional differences between the two, leading to free variation and apparently arbitrary lexicalization of forms with and without ka-…-a. It is also worth noting that apart from the restrictions just discussed, there are other more straightforwardly pragmatic restrictions on which interpretations appear with which types of predicates. For example, it is difficult to accidentally become a chief, but it makes perfect sense to talk about whether one is able to become a chief. Conversely, it is not usual to talk about the sun being able to come up. Nevertheless, many predicates allow multiple interpretations, depending on the context. For example, (7d) above, The boy broke the window accidentally, can also mean The boy managed to break the window, given an appropriate discourse context. Note also that the ability reading is very general and applies even to unaccusatives, yielding an -able reading. One example of these was given in (5a) above; another is given in (17): (17) In the next sub-section we begin the process of unifying the various interpretations of ka-…-a. First we argue for a unification of the ability and the manage-to interpretations, and then for the accidentally, the suddenly and non-controllable interpretations.
2.3
Unifying the interpretations 2.3.1 Manage-to = ability Davis (2006) (following a suggestion by Demirdache 1997) shows that the manage-to reading of predicates with ka-…-a, unlike the English implicative verb manage lacks an actuality entailment. Before we present the evidence for this claim, we introduce some background about English manage. As argued by Karttunen (1971) and Karttunen and Peters (1979) , a sentence containing manage asserts that an event took place, and conventionally implicates that there was some difficulty involved. This is illustrated in (18) . Conventional implicature: Sitting through a Chinese opera requires some effort for John. (Bhatt 1999: 179) As predicted by this analysis, the assertion does not project when manage is in the scope of negation while the conventional implicature does. Thus, the truth of (19) entails the falsity of (18a), but not of (18b): (19) John didn't manage to sit through the Chinese opera. These data indicate that what we have been calling the manage-to interpretation does not carry an actuality entailment, but an actuality implicature which arises in a past episodic context. 9 We thus follow Davis (2006) in arguing that the ability and the manage-to interpretations are reducible to the ability reading. 10 2.3.2 Accidentally = suddenly = non-controllable = 'no choice' Davis (2006) argues that the accidentally and the suddenly interpretations of ka-…-a are also reducible to a single reading. The basic intuition behind this move is that events that are accidents often happen suddenly, and vice versa. In contrast to Davis (2006) , however, we will provide evidence here that it is the accidentalness (= lack of choice) which is critical for this unified reading, not the suddenness. We will therefore name the unified interpretation no-choice.
Evidence that the accidental (= lack of choice) aspect of meaning is basic to ka-…-a comes from the fact that the suddenly aspect is often cancelable, but the accidental aspect is not. In other words, ka-…-a never yields a deliberate-but-sudden reading, only an accidental -and possibly, but not necessarily, sudden -reading. This is shown in (22-23) Note that the consultant corrects (23a), which infelicitously contains ka-…-a, to (23b), which lacks it.
On the other hand, (24) (25) show that it is possible to obtain an accidentally-but-notsuddenly reading for ka-…-a. These data suggest that it is the accidentally notion that is basic, and that the suddenly effect is a cancelable implicature. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the language possesses a separate lexical item which expresses 'suddenly' (lep, as in example (23b) above), but there is no separate lexical item to express 'accidentally'.
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Once we have unified the accidentally with the suddenly interpretation, it is but a small step to observe that the non-controllable cases share a fundamentally similar semantics. The core idea is that there is a lack of choice or control. In the accidentally cases, this is because an agent who could potentially be in control of the event is not actually in control; in the non-controllable cases, there was never any agent who is even potentially in charge. Note that just like the accidentally cases, the non-controllable cases often implicate suddenness, but they need not, as shown in (27).
(27) a.
skenkín=t'u7 kw=s=ka-t'ép=s-a slow=ADD
We conclude from the data presented in this sub-section that the core meaning of all the non-abilityrelated interpretations of ka-…-a is that something happened -or rather, had to happen -without the choice of any agent. The suddenly aspect of meaning is merely a conversational implicature, deriving from the fact that accidents usually -but not necessarily -happen all of a sudden.
One further important point is worth making here. Though it is much more difficult to demonstrate, the no choice reading of ka-…-a lacks an actuality entailment, just like the ability ('manage to') reading. The reason it is so difficult to show this is that when an event has to happen, in the normal course of events, it does happen. So we need to find an abnormal course of events to demonstrate that the actuality of the event is cancelable. The following scenario is designed with this in mind: (28) qvl ta=s7exw7unám-s=a k=Gillian i=nátcw=as.
bad DET=cold-3POSS=EXIS DET=Gillian when(PAST)=day=3CONJ 'Gillian had a very bad cough yesterday.' stexw wa7 n-tqép-leqs. really IMPF LOC-blocked-nose 'Her nose was really plugged up.'
kens-q'á7 ku=t'ec szaq' t'u7 ka-nsnán7-a try-eat DET=sweet bread but
CIRC-sneeze-CIRC
'She started to eat some sweet bread, but she had to sneeze.' t'u7 t'eqwp-álts ti=tsítcw-s=a nílh=t'u7 s=zuqw=s but explode-house DET-house-3POSS=EXIS FOC=ADD NOM=die=3POSS
'But then her house exploded and she died.'
Interviewer: She never got to eat her sweet bread and she never got to sneeze? Consultant: Right.
In this scenario, we see that the actuality of the sneezing event is cancelable, when events take an unexpected (and tragic) course. This is important in that it shows that the no-choice reading of ka-…-a shares fundamental properties with the ability reading, suggesting that even these two apparently quite dissimilar interpretations should ultimately be unified. This is precisely the task to which we turn in the next section. We provide an analysis according to which the ability reading is an existential circumstantial modal use, and the no-choice reading is a universal circumstantial modal use. Crucially, we do not analyze the two interpretations as a case of lexical ambiguity, but rather of non-specification or generality, following the approach we have taken to other modals in St'át'imcets (Rullmann et al. to appear) . The fact that ka-…-a acts just like other modals in St'át'imcets in lexically specifying conversational background but not quantificational strength provides strong indirect evidence that the current analysis is on the right track, while at the same time reinforcing the generalizations that underpin our previous analysis of modality in St'át'imcets.
3.
Ka-…-a as a circumstantial modal
We begin this section in 3.1 by briefly summarizing our previous work on modals in St'át'imcets (Rullmann et al. to appear, Matthewson et al. 2006) , which is implemented within the formal framework of Kratzer (1977 Kratzer ( , 1981 Kratzer ( , 1991 . We then introduce Kratzer's analysis of circumstantial modality in 3.2, before returning to our analysis of ka-…-a. We show in 3.3 that the ability interpretation of ka-…-a displays exactly the range of meanings which are predicted for an existential circumstantial modal, and in 3.4 that the no-choice interpretation displays the range of meanings which we expect a universal circumstantial modal to have. 12 In section 3.5 we turn to the formal analysis, which we implement along the lines of our previous choice function analysis of modals in St'át'imcets.
Quantificational strength and conversational background: modals in English and St'át'imcets
We start from the standard view that in English (and other familiar languages) modals are quantifiers over possible worlds. For example, must and should are universal quantifiers whereas can, could, may, and mightare existential quantifiers. As is well known, English modals can have many different readings, including deontic, epistemic, and circumstantial. To account for this, Kratzer (1977 Kratzer ( , 1981 Kratzer ( , 1991 argued that the discourse context provides what she called a conversational background for the modal. (29) and (30) (Kratzer 1991:640) According to Kratzer, the conversational background consists of two components: the modal base and the ordering source. The modal base is a function which maps each world onto the set of worlds that are accessible from it. In any given world, the modal only quantifies over these accessible worlds. The ordering source ranks worlds in some contextually-determined way and further restricts the domain of quantification of the modal to worlds at one end of the ranking. (29), for example, has an epistemic modal base: must only quantifies over worlds which are compatible with our knowledge about the crime in the evaluation world. The set of worlds quantified over is narrowed down further by what Kratzer calls a stereotypical ordering source: only those worlds are considered which are closest to "the normal course of events" in the evaluation world. For example, it is not required that Michl is the murderer in unusual worlds where humans are routinely killed by aliens. In (30), must quantifies over worlds which are compatible with certain facts in the evaluation world (a circumstantial modal base), and which are closest to the ideal given by "what the law provides" (a normative ordering source). In recent work (Rullmann et al. to appear, Matthewson et al. 2006) we have identified two important and systematic differences between the behaviour of modals in St'át'imcets and the behaviour of modals in English and other well-studied European systems. Firstly, in contrast to English, the distinction between different types of conversational backgrounds is lexically marked in St'át'imcets. That is, there is a set of "evidential" modals that allow only particular kinds of epistemic conversational backgrounds, and there is a different ("irrealis") modal that allows deontic or counterfactual, but not epistemic backgrounds. This means that must in (29) and (30), for example, will be translated into two different modals in St'át'imcets: In Rullmann et al. (to appear) we proposed a unified formal analysis of the quantificational variability of St'át'imcets modals using choice functions over possible worlds. In 3.5 below we will extend this formal analysis to ka-…-a. First, however, we need to discuss its modal base, since one of our principal claims here is that ka-…-a is lexically specified as a pure circumstantial modal.
Circumstantial modality
Pure circumstantials have a circumstantial modal base (just like deontics), but a stereotypical ordering source rather than a normative one. 14 In this section we illustrate the types of meanings we expect to find with this kind of modal.
Circumstantial conversational backgrounds are concerned with what is possible or necessary given certain facts about the way the world is. In other words, a circumstantial conversational background picks out a set of worlds in which some set of facts which hold in the evaluation world hold. As Kratzer (1991:646) 
puts it:
In using an epistemic modal, we are interested in what else may or must be the case in our world given all the evidence available. Using a circumstantial modal, we are interested in the necessities implied by or the possibilities opened up by certain sorts of facts.
Kratzer's example illustrating the contrast between epistemic and circumstantial modality is given in (35), along with her explanation below. (35) (36a) says that it is consistent with certain facts (the size of this can of milk, Cathy's cheese-making abilities, and so on) that Cathy could make a pound of cheese out of this milk. In evaluating (36a) we do not take into account Cathy's current whereabouts or intentions, or the fact that the speaker is about to consume the can of milk before it can be made into cheese. (36b), on the other hand, claims that there is at least one possible world consistent with all the available evidence in which Cathy makes cheese out of this milk. If Cathy is 10,000 miles away at the time of utterance and the speaker is about to consume the can of milk, (36a) can be true but (36b) is false. In the literature, various subtypes of circumstantial modality have been distinguished. Ability attributions (as in (36a)) are usually analyzed as existential circumstantial modals (e.g., Kratzer 1991 , Hackl 1998 , but see Bhatt 1999 for a different analysis). However, existential circumstantials need not ascribe abilities per se. Thus, in (35a) we would not say that hydrangeas "have the ability" to grow here. Many authors make a distinction between "dispositional" readings, which talk about the subject's abilities, desires, or dispositions, and pure circumstantials, which are not relativized to a subject. This distinction is further illustrated in (37).
(37) a.
Sally can come along (because the car fits five). pure circumstantial b.
Sally can swim (she is able to). dispositional circumstantial (Lechner 2005:2) We will henceforth refer to the pure circumstantial reading as the impersonal reading and the dispositional reading as the personal reading. The two readings are spelled out in (38):
(38) Impersonal modality: Meaning of the proposition can be calculated by considering only the facts and circumstances of the background
Personal modality: Interpretation is dependent upon properties of the subject (dispositions, abilities, desires) 16, 17 (cf. Jockl had to sneeze.
(40) universal epistemic: a.
Jockl must be sneezing (in view of the evidence available to me). b.
Jockl must have sneezed.
(39a) asserts that in all worlds in which the actual state of Jockl's nose, Jockl's respiratory tract, and the atmospheric conditions hold, Jockl sneezes. In other words, Jockl has no choice but to sneeze. We will show below that St'át'imcets ka-…-a also has this kind of use. Note, however, that in both languages, universal circumstantial modals are relatively rare, particularly in future contexts. Even in situations where the facts absolutely force something to happen, future modals are usually preferred (e.g., The bomb will / is going to / * must explode at 6pm.). We return to this issue in 3.4.
3.3
The 'ability' interpretation of ka-…-a as an existential circumstantial reading
Recall that we have reduced the five interpretations associated with ka-…-a to two: ability and nochoice. Now, we take a closer look at the type of interpretations subsumed under ability, to convince ourselves that we are dealing with an existential circumstantial modal. Firstly, we see ka-…-a used for core cases of ability attributions, as in (41-42), along with their past tense versions, as in (43), which -as discussed above -are often translated as 'managed to'. 
ka-xilh-tal'í-ha ku=xwém
CIRC-do(CAUS)-TOP-CIRC DET=fast
'They did that to see who could do it the fastest.' (Matthewson 2005:88) (43) nilh (s-)sek-qw-án'-itas, aylh ka-zuqw-s-twítas-a FOC NOM-hit-head-DIR-3PL.ERG then CIRC-die-CAUS-3PL.ERG-CIRC '…so they hit them on the head and managed to kill them.' (Matthewson 2005:144) The ability interpretations fall squarely into the personal sub-type of circumstantial modality introduced above. However, ka-…-a is not restricted to personal modality interpretations: it also has impersonal readings, as illustrated in (44). The meaning of this proposition relies only on the facts and circumstances of the background, namely how big the bags were.
(44) í7ez' kw=s=xzum=s kw=s=ka-k'úl'-a ku=nkúp-s enough DET=NOM=big=3POSS DET=NOM=CIRC-make-CIRC DET=mattress-3POSS ku=pápla7 xzum úcwalmicw DET=one big person 'They [the bags] were big enough to make a mattress for one big person (i.e.: they were big enough that they could be made into a mattress for one big person) (Matthewson 2005:75) Other 
Consultant's comment: "If somebody brought some seeds it would grow here -it's just a possibility it would grow here."
(48) below shows that it is not contradictory to assert that no Douglas-firsare growing here, while at the same time asserting that it is circumstantially possible that they can grow here.
(48) cw7aoz ku=wá7 srap-7úl lts7a, t'u7 wa7 ka-ríp-a lts7a NEG DET=IMPF tree-real here but IMPF CIRC-grow-CIRC here 'There are no Douglas-firs around here, but they can grow here.' For comparison, (49) shows the epistemic half of the hydrangeas minimal pair. The consultant volunteers the epistemic modal =k'a instead of ka-…-a here. (47) situation. This reflects the status of =k'a as an unambiguously epistemic modal (see Matthewson et al. 2006 for analysis). Sentence (47) is accepted in the (49) situation. However, this does not mean that ka-…--a has an epistemic reading. Rather, the situation for (47) states that the conditions for the circumstantial modal are also met in this case; hence, we would expect ka-…-a to be licensed in this context. More generally, if it is epistemically possible that sagebrush grows here, it will also be circumstantially possible, but not necessarily vice versa.
As a final piece of evidence that we are dealing with an existential circumstantial modal, observe that English circumstantial canis distinguishable from epistemic can in that the latter is infelicitous if the speaker is witnessing the event. For example, a speaker who is looking at rain falling from the sky can felicitously utter (50a), but not (50b) (unless as a joke). (50) The data in this section lead us to conclude that ka-…-a is used in all types of contexts that license existential circumstantial interpretations. We have not found any case of an existential circumstantial modal that cannot be rendered using ka-…-a.
The no-choice reading of ka-…-a as a universal circumstantial reading
In this section we argue that the range of uses of the no-choice reading are those predicted by an analysis of ka-…-a as having a universal circumstantial interpretation. Recall that the no-choice reading covers cases which translate into English as 'accidentally', as in (52) 'He saw that the soaked fish had turned white.' (Matthewson 2005:153) In section 2.3 we argued that what all these readings have in common is a lack of choice on the part of the subject. The central idea is that if an event happens without any choice, then all the facts of the world conspire to make that event inevitable. The core semantics of no-choice thus correlates with the semantics of universal circumstantials as discussed by Kratzer (1991) .
Universal circumstantials and the future
In this subsection we deal with a potential problem with the claim that the no-choice interpretation of ka-..-a corresponds to a universal circumstantial. When speakers of St'át'imcets are given more or less direct translations of English sentences such as (55) containing universal modals with a circumstantial interpretation, they do not generally accept ka-…-a, as shown in (56). Instead, they offer equivalents with a plain future auxiliary or enclitic, as in (57) We think that what is going on here is that with eventive predicates, a universal circumstantial is very similar to a future meaning. What does it mean for Gertie to sneeze in every possible world consistent with the relevant facts? It means she is going to sneeze. Recall that futures have circumstantial modal bases; they thus quantify over the same kinds of modal bases as plain circumstantials do. Futures and plain circumstantials also share an ordering source, namely a stereotypical one (cf. Kratzer 1991 , Copley 2002 . In both the sentences Gertie has to sneeze and Gertie is going to sneeze, we quantify over all worlds where the actual world facts about Gertie's nose hold, and in which the normal course of events takes place. (For example, we do not in either case consider worlds where, one millisecond after the utterance, a nuclear attack takes place and Gertie is vapourized.) It may even be that the sentences Gertie has to sneeze and Gertie is going to sneeze differ only in that the latter explicitly specifies that the sneezing takes place after the utterance time. The simplified formulas in (58) and (59) We thus propose that the absence of ka-…-a in sentences like (57) is not due to the absence of a universal circumstantial reading for ka-…-a, but instead reflects a temporal issue with eventive predicates. Either Gertie is already sneezing (in which case a simple present tense (imperfective) form will be used), or she is not sneezing yet but she has to sneeze. In the latter case, it follows that she is going to sneeze, and speakers prefer to use an explicit future. Of course, this does not explain the difference between St'át'imcets, where a future is required in these cases, and English, where it is not. However, as observed above, the universal circumstantial use of must is very restricted in English as well, being often absent when its truth conditions would be satisfied.
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The idea that the problem with (57) results merely from interference from the future, rather than the absence of a universal circumstantial reading, is confirmed by the finding that when we put the same situation into the past, we do get ka-…-a, as in (60). (60) 
Circumstantial imperatives with ka-…-a
Before turning to the formal implementation of our analysis, we would like to bring one more set of facts to light, which we believe strongly support our view of ka-…-a as a circumstantial modal. These involve a previously unexplained use of ka-…-a on imperatives. Examples are given in (63), from Davis (2006: Chapter 25) . (63) Imperatives with ka-…-a are used when the speaker wishes to express a particularly forceful command or admonition. We suggest that this is because ka-…-a in these cases is being used as a universal circumstantial -essentially, giving the addressee "no choice" as to what to do. (In contrast, the deontic/irrealis modal =ka 'should, would' has weaker force than an ordinary imperative, and is used to express a less forceful injunction.) The imperative use of circumstantial modality is thus an implicature, similar to that which holds with the (future) circumstantial modal in English, as in You will go to bed this instant!. The imperative use of ka-…-a is particularly striking because alternative accounts (either based on an aspectual analysis, or taking "control" to be an irreducible primitive) either have nothing to say about it, or must produce ad-hoc extensions to account for it. In contrast, on the modal analysis, the imperative use falls out quite naturally.
Unifying the existential and universal interpretations
We have now reduced the set of available interpretations of ka-…-a to two, as summarized in the table in (64).
(64) existential = ability universal = no-choice able to manage to accidentally suddenly non-controllable imperative
The question now arises as to whether a further unification is possible. Can a semantics for ka-…-a be given that unifies the existential and universal interpretations, or should we simply be content with positing a lexical ambiguity? Recall that in our previous work (summarized in 3.1 above), we have provided exactly such a unification for the existential and universal interpretations of epistemic and deontic modals. We will show in this section that this analysis can be extended quite naturally to ka-…-a, which has a fixed (circumstantial) modal base but variable quantificational force.
In Rullmann et al. (to appear) we accounted for the (apparent) quantificational variability of modals in St'át'imcets by presenting a unified formal analysis involving choice functions over possible worlds, which was inspired by previous work by Klinedinst (2005) . Before we extend this analysis to ka-…-a, we need to address a difference between ka-…-a and other modals. As we have seen, ka-…-a attaches to the predicate, and therefore -unlike other St'át'imcets modals -does not take scope over the entire proposition. Furthermore, as we will see in section 4, it is sensitive to properties of the external argument. We will therefore assume it takes the predicate and its external argument to produce a proposition, i.e., it is of type <<e,<s,t>>,<e,<s,t>>>. As a first pass, we give separate representations of the existential and universal interpretations of ka-…-a in (65-66). We are leaving the ordering source out of the truth conditions for reasons of simplicity. In our previous work on other St'át'imcets modals (Rullmann, et al. to appear, Matthewson et al. 2006) , we achieved a unification of the existential and universal interpretations by positing a choice function over possible worlds which selects a subset of B(w) (the set of worlds that are accessible from w). The basic schema is adapted in (67) for ka-…-a. This kind of analysis allows us to obtain the existential versus universal uses by varying the size of the set of accessible worlds which are considered. If the entire set of accessible worlds constitutes the restrictor of the modal quantifier, the interpretation ends up equivalent to a universal modal. If a proper subset of accessible worlds makes up the restrictor of the modal quantifier, the interpretation is weakened to that of an existential modal. For more detailed discussion of this analysis, we refer to Rullmann et al. (to appear) . Note that in this analysis, the choice function f is relativized to the subject argument x. This reflects the fact that the choice of subset of possible worlds in the modal base may depend on certain properties (dispositions, abilities, and desires) of the subject. In other words, (67) captures what we have called the personal reading of ka-…-a. In section 4.5, we present a slightly different representation for the impersonal reading.
Restrictions on impersonal readings of ka-…-a
So far in our analysis, we have been operating under the assumption that -barring pragmatic effects -all interpretations of ka-…-a are available with all predicates. However, as already noted in 2.2.5, this is not entirely true: non-controllable (impersonal universal) readings are missing for (causative) transitive predicates. In this section, we return to this restriction, and argue that it is part of a broader pattern: impersonal readings of ka-…-a are systematically blocked for all predicates with external arguments. This generalization in turn forces us to slightly refine our formal analysis of circumstantial modality. First, however, let us remind ourselves of the distinction between the personal and impersonal readings of circumstantial modals. In (68), we repeat the definition given in (38) above. Since "the facts and circumstances of the background" may include properties of the subject, it is not always an easy task to sort out the personal and impersonal readings. 20 Nevertheless, there is one interpretation of ka-…-a that can only be impersonal: namely, the non-controllable sub-case of the no-choice (universal) reading. We can therefore use this as a probe to test for gaps in the distribution of impersonal readings. This is the task to which we now turn.
The missing non-controllable reading of causatives
As mentioned in 2.2.5 (and exemplified in (10-11)), ka-…-a fails to yield a non-controllable interpretation when affixed to transitive (causative) predicates with an inanimate subject. This is further illustrated in (65) with the predicate sek-qw-s 'hit somebody on the head'. In (65a), we see that with ka-…-a and an inanimate subject, only personal (accidental and manage-to) interpretations are available. Since these readings are pragmatically incompatible with inanimate subjects, incongruity results. When asked to provide the missing (and pragmatically felicitous) noncontrollable interpretation for sentences such as (69a), speakers substitute a plain causative with no ka-.. .-a, as in (69b) . (Recall that on its non-controllable interpretation ka-…-a does not make a contribution to the assertion expressed by the sentence, and therefore results in English translations with a simple verb.) (69) a. # ka-sek-qw-s-túmc-as-a ta=kecmáksta=a
CIRC-hit-head-CAUS-1SG.OBJ-3ERG-CIRC DET=branch=EXIS
# 'The branch hit me on the head by accident.' # 'The branch managed to hit me on the head.' * 'The branch hit me on the head.' (non-controllable interpretation unavailable)
b. sek-qw-s-túmc-as ta=kecmákst=a hit-head-CAUS-1SG.OBJ-3ERG DET=tree=EXIS 'The branch hit me on the head.'
The absence of the non-controllable interpretation for (69a) is all the more surprising since this is the dominant interpretation of parallel intransitive cases such as (70): (70) ka-kíts-a láti7 ta=kecmákst=a
CIRC-lie-CIRC
there DET=branch=EXIS 'The branch fell down there.' (Alexander et al. 2006) It appears, then, that for some reason the impersonal interpretation of the universal circumstantial is unavailable for transitive predicates, though it is available for intransitives. However, it turns out the relevant distinction is not between transitive and intransitive predicates, but between those with and without an external argument. More specifically :
(71) Impersonal interpretations of ka-…-a are only available for predicates without an external argument
What this means is that only unaccusative predicates allow non-controllable interpretations. If we look at the non-controllable cases we have examined so far (see the examples in 2.2.5 above), this is indeed the case. But we can make a stronger argument for the external argument-based generalization in (71) by looking at two cases which clearly distinguish it from a transitivity-based alternative. The first involves intransitive predicates which have an external argument (i.e., unergatives), the second transitive predicates which lack one (i.e., transitive unaccusatives). In the first case, (71) predicts impersonal interpretations should be blocked, while an explanation based on transitivity predicts they should be licit; in the second, (71) predicts the impersonal interpretation should be allowed, while the transitivity-based account predicts it will be blocked.We examine these cases in 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.
The missing non-controllable reading of unergatives
In order to test whether unergatives in St'át'imcets can ever have a non-controllable interpretation, we must fulfill two prerequisites: first, identify a set of criteria which distinguish unergatives from unaccusatives; and second, find a set of unergatives which allow inanimate subjects (since noncontrollable interpretations are much easier to distinguish with inanimate subjects). The first of these tasks is relatively easy, since most unergative predicates in St'át'imcets are readily distinguishable from unaccusatives on the basis of morphology. More specifically, unergatives are usually suffixed with an intransitivizer, whereas unaccusatives never are (see Davis 1997 Davis , 2006 for extensive discussion).
The second is much more difficult, because unergatives in St'át'imcets are usually associated with animate subjects, which strongly favour a personal interpretation of ka-…-a. Nevertheless, it is possible to have an inanimate subject with unergative predicates, in cases where the external argument can still be construed as an "actor", even without the possibility of volition. For example, a disease spreads contagion, as in (72a), and a poison acts on its victim, as in (72b).
(72) a.
mel't-cál ti7 ku=s-7áolsem infected-ACT DEM DET=NOM-sick 'That sickness is/was infectious, infects/infected people.' b.
zúqw-cal ti7 ku=kál'wat die-ACT DEM DET=medicine 'That medicine is/was poisonous, poisons/poisoned people.' (literally, 'kills/killed')
We can now ask whether predicates like mel'tcál or zúqwcal can yield a universal impersonal (noncontrollable) interpretation when affixed with ka-…-a.
The answer is negative, as can be seen from the translations volunteered by the consultants for the examples in (73): (73) Note that the speaker specifically rejects translations for the examples in (73) where an event of infecting or poisoning has actually taken place, even though these interpretations are available for the same predicates without ka-…-a, as shown in (72). We take this as evidence that the impersonal reading of ka-…-a is blocked for unergatives, just as it is for causatives. This in turn means that what is crucial for the missing non-controllable reading is not transitivity, but the presence of an external argument.
The non-controllable reading of transitive unaccusatives
We now turn to the converse case: transitive predicates without an external argument. Once again, first we must find some. A plausible set of candidates consists of a class of unaccusative verbs which may be directly suffixed with the redirective transitivizer -min. Since -min simply adds an extra (oblique) internal argument (Davis 2006: Chapter 41) , with unaccusative verbs, the surface subject of the transitive alternant with -min is the same as the surface subject of the intransitive alternant (i.e., an internal argument), while the surface object may have a variety of oblique functions.
As predicted by (71), these predicates do allow non-controllable interpretations with ka-…-a, as shown in (74a) and (75a); moreover, these interpretations are identical to those of the intransitive (unaccusative) verbs on which they are based, as can be seen in (74b) (repeated from (9b)) and in (75b)). (74) 
Non-controllable readiungs with passives
Further evidence for the generalization in (71) is provided by passives. Recall that a causative predicate like páqu7+s 'to frighten' is incompatible with ka-…-a and an inanimate subject, due to the fact that only a personal interpretation is permitted for predicates with an external argument, yet personal interpretations are generally infelicitous with inanimate subjects:
The storm accidentally frightened me.'
However, when passivized, páqu7+s is compatible with ka-…-a and an inanimate causer, with an impersonal universal (non-controllable) interpretation, as can be seen in (77): This provides striking support for the generalization that it is the lack of an external argument that allows a non-controlled reading for ka-…-a, particularly in view of the fact that the St'át'imcets passive is of the impersonal type, which does not promote the internal argument to the syntactic subject position.
Impersonal existential readings
In the last three sections, we have shown that the non-controllable (impersonal universal) reading is systematically absent with predicates which have an external argument, irrespective of transitivity. By extension, we might expect that impersonal existential readings will also be absent in this environment. This is more difficult to demonstrate, however, in that there is no straightforward diagnostic for an existential impersonal circumstantial. Of the two main sub-types of existential interpretation we have identified -ability and manage-to -the latter is clearly associated only with personal readings (compare for example It could get really hot in those days with *It managed to get really hot in those days). This is also arguably true of be able to (as evidenced by the oddness of ??It was able to get really hot in those days) but it is clearly not true of can/could, which is equally felicitous with personal and impersonal readings. This means that it is often impossible to tell from translation alone whether a given instance of ka-…-a on its existential use is impersonal or personal. For example, sentences like (78-79), involving the unergative predicate t'cum 'win', appear at first sight to be paradigm cases of the impersonal existential interpretation. Indeed, they are modeled on English examples from Lechner (2005) which were deliberately constructed to illustrate impersonal circumstantial readings, since the ability to win at bingo is not a personal attribute of the winner, but a function of luck and the rules of the game. Since unergatives are by definition predicates with an external argument, the examples in (78-79) appear to violate the generalization in (71).
However, on further examination, it is not so clear that the interpretation of these examples is necessarily impersonal -however minimal the personal ability needed to play bingo, it is still the case that the player must show up, dab the numbers, and so on. Note also that in English, Not everyone is able to win and Everyone is able to win are acceptable alternatives to Not everyone can win and Everyone can win, in contrast to truly impersonal cases of existential circumstantials (such as those involving weather predicates) where only can/could is felicitous.
It is also the case that more clear-cut impersonal existentials in St'át'imcets (such as those with -able readings: see (5a), (6c), (17) ) are all based on unaccusative predicates (see also (44-48), (51)). We conclude that though the evidence is more difficult to interpret with existential than with universal circumstantials, the generalization in (71) holds for both types.
Refining the analysis
We have now established that an impersonal interpretation for ka-…-a is possible just in case the predicate to which it attaches lacks an external argument. We will not attempt a full explanatiuon for this generalization here, which cross-cuts the distinction between existential and universal interpretations of circumstantial modality, and raises many further questions about how properties of the subject interact with circumstantial modality. Instead, we will content ourselves here with revising our formal analysis of circumstantial modality to account for impersonal as well as personal interpretations.
Recall our formal analysis of ka-…-a, repeated below from (71) Here, we have defined ka-…-a as a function from predicates to predicates (of type <<e,<s,t>>, <e,<s,t>>>, abstracting away from events, for simplicity's sake). As noted above, this handles personal but not impersonal interpretations. In order to capture the latter, we need a separate formula, where ka-…-a is defined as a function from propositions to propositions (of type <<s,t>,<s,t>>), as in (81) Obviously, this is a somewhat provisional solution to the problem posed by the external argument restriction. We must leave a more explanatory account for future work.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have offered a radical reanalysis of the St'át'imcets "out of control" circumfix ka-…-a as a circumstantial modal, in contrast to previous approaches, which have either treated it as part of a sui generis "control system", or as an aspectual operator. In doing so, we have also provided independent support for a striking generalization which distinguishes the St'át'imcets modal system from its counterparts in English and other familiar languages. English modals are lexically distinguished by quantificational force (existential versus universal) but are unselective with respect to the modal base. In contrast, as documented in Rullmann et al. (to appear) and Matthewson et al (2006) , St'át'imcets modals show the opposite profile, being unselective with respect to quantificational force but lexically encoding distinctions in the modal base (e.g., epistemic versus deontic). In the present paper, we have extended this difference to circumstantial modality, by showing that the five interpretations associated with ka-…-a are associated with variable quantificational force (existential for the ability and manage-to interpretations, universal for the accidentally, suddenly, and non-controllable interpretations), but involve the same (circumstantial) modal base.
In addition, we have investigated a cross-cutting semantic distinction between personal ("dispositional") and impersonal readings of ka-…-a. In particular, we have shown that impersonal interpretations are systematically blocked by external arguments. We suspect that it is this restriction which is behind the persistent intuition that ka-…-a should be characterized in terms of "agent control", though obviously, much more work needs to be done here.
Our conclusions have implications that extend well beyond the grammar of St'át'imcets. To start with, our analysis invites comparison with control phenomena in other Salish languages, which have been regarded as comprising a unified "control system" (see Thompson 1979 Thompson , 1985 . Our work suggests otherwise: it seems unlikely that the modal treatment we have given here for ka-…-a will extend straightforwardly to more typical transitivity-based control alternations, or indeed, to other Salish "out-of-control" phenomena, as exemplified by C 2 reduplication (Carlson and Thompson 1982, Kinkade 1982) . A systematic comparison is clearly warranted.
Beyond Salish, there is an intriguing resemblance between ka-…-a and the Austronesian "ability/involuntary action" (AIA) marker, which exhibits a parallel cluster of interpretations (see Dell 1983 /4, Kroeger 1993 , and Mills 2005 . It remains an open question how close the parallel is, and whether our modal analysis of ka-…-a can be extended to its Austronesian counterparts.
One way in which the interpretation of ka-…-a differs not only from Austronesian languages like Tagalog, but also from ability modals in more familiar Indo-European languages is with respect to the actuality entailment of the perfective ability reading. As mentioned in note 10, in both Tagalog and Malagasy, predicates in the perfective with the AIA morpheme have an entailment of culmination (Kroeger 1993 , Travis 2000 . And as argued by Bhatt (1999) and Hacquard (2006) , existential modals in the perfective in a number of Indo-European languages (including French, Italian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Hindi) have actuality entailments like English manage to. In contrast, as we have seen, the manage-to interpretation of ka-…-a only has a cancelable actuality implicature (see 2.3.1 above). We do not know whether this difference is primitive, or derivative from some other property of the languages in question; neither do we currently know of other systems with a St'át'imcets-type actuality implicature. Clearly, further investigation is needed. 
